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Summary 
Previous literature has suggested that different mechanisms of transmission of exogenous oil 
shocks are responsible for the negative effects on the economic performances of oil 
exporting countries. This paper aims at providing further evidence on the role of sectoral 
reallocation between private and public sectors in explaining the impact of shocks to oil 
revenues on the economic growth rates of major oil producing countries (namely the GCC - 
Gulf Corporation Council - countries). The effects of oil shocks and expansionary fiscal 
policy on the business cycle of oil producing countries are examined. The possibility to 
distinguish between various components of public sector spending policy (that is, purchases 
of consumption goods, investments in productive activities and compensation for public 
employees) is, in particular, allowed for. A real business cycle (RBC) model is calibrated to 
fit the data on an “average” oil producing country. Results from the simulation of the 
theoretical model suggest that the possibility that crowding-out effects of public over private 
investments can explain a large fraction of the negative effects of shocks to oil revenues on 
the private sector of the economy. In addition, since the growth in size of the public sector is 
unable to compensate for the reduction in size of the private sector, an increase in oil 
revenues has the effect to decrease total output. An expansionary fiscal policy is argued to 
have significant positive effects on private investments, employment and overall production. 
On the contrary, a shock to government consumption expenditure impacts negatively the 
level of public investment. As employment in the public sector increases significantly, public 
output responds positively to a shock in government consumption expenditure. Finally, an 
instantaneous negative effect on total investments and on the stock of capital in the 
economy is predicted. However, driven by the increase of the number of employees in the 
economy, total output expands.  
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Abstract
Previous literature has suggested that dierent mechanisms of transmission
of exogenous oil shocks are responsible for the negative eects on the eco-
nomic performances of oil exporting countries.
This paper aims at providing further evidence on the role of sectoral reallo-
cation between private and public sectors in explaining the impact of shocks
to oil revenues on the economic growth rates of major oil producing countries
(namely the GCC - Gulf Corporation Council - countries). The eects of oil
shocks and expansionary scal policy on the business cycle of oil producing
countries are examined. The possibility to distinguishing between various
components of public sector spending policy (that is, purchases of consump-
tion goods, investments in productive activities and compensation for public
employees) is, in particular, allowed for.
A real business cycle (RBC) model is calibrated to t the data on an \av-
erage" oil producing country. Results from the simulation of the theoretical
model suggest that the possibility that crowding-out eects of public over
private investments can explain a large fraction of the negative eects of
shocks to oil revenues on the private sector of the economy. In addition,
since the growth in size of the public sector is not able to compensate for
the reduction in size of the private sector, an increase in oil revenues has the
eect to decrease total output.
Corresponding author
Email addresses: alessandro.cologni@edison.it (Alessandro Cologni),
matteo.manera@unimib.it (Matteo Manera)
1An expansionary scal policy is argued to have signicant positive eects on
private investments, employment and overall production. On the contrary, a
shock to government consumption expenditure impacts negatively the level of
public investment. As employment in the public sector increases signicantly,
public output responds positively to a shock in government consumption ex-
penditure. Finally, an instantaneous negative eect on total investments and
on the stock of capital in the economy is predicted. However, driven by the
increase of the number of employees in the economy, total output expands.
Keywords: Oil Shocks, Dutch Disease, Resource Curse and Real Busi-
ness Cycle Modelling
JEL Classication Numbers: C61; E22; E62; Q48
21. Introduction and literature review
There is a large body of research which tries to assess how oil shocks in
u-
ence the business cycle of oil producing countries. According to many empir-
ical papers, countries which are endowed with relevant natural resources are
characterized by lower economic growth rates with respect to countries with
few natural resources. Important studies on the failures of resource-led devel-
opment include, for instance, Gelb and Associates [1], Sachs and Warner [2],
Sachs and Warner [3], Sala-i Martin and Subramanian [4], Gylfason [5]. In
particular, Sachs and Warner [3] nd a strong inverse relationship between
the log of the export contribution to growth during the period 1970-1990
and the log of natural resource abundance in 1970. Sachs and Warner [2]
brie
y survey the Dutch disease explanation for the natural resource curse.
According to this mechanism, export windfalls have adverse eects on the
real exchange rate of these countries. This, in turn, renders most other
exports uncompetitive. Thus a rapid and, often distorted, growth of the
non-tradeable sector may occur. In turn, the industrialization process of the
country, as well as the traditional economic sectors (i.e. agriculture), are neg-
atively aected. As noted by Sala-i Martin and Subramanian [4], countries
that depend heavily on the export of natural resources tend to suer from
a variety of problems, including authoritarian governance, antistate protests
and/or civil wars, high corruption levels, high poverty rates, etc.1; 2
In this work, we aim at studying a dierent, but by no means less important,
mechanism of transmission of oil shocks to the overall economy of oil pro-
ducing countries, which is represented by the reallocation eects associated
with oil shocks and the scal policy implemented by the government.
Starting from the pioneristic works of Bruno [7], Forsyth and Kay [8], Corden
and Neary [9], the eects of domestic resource discoveries on tradeable and
non-tradeable sectors of open economies are assessed by many theoretical
and empirical studies. According to this branch of literature, oil discover-
1For a review of the literature on the eects of oil endowments on oil producing countries
see Alexeev and Conrad [6].
2Other authors nd a positive eect of a large endowment of oil and other mineral
resources on long-term economic growth. According to Alexeev and Conrad [6], although
large endowments of oil and other mineral resources do not aect signicantly political
institutions, positive eects on long-term economic growth may nevertheless occur.
3ies prompts huge booms in investments, especially in the non-traded goods
sectors of the economy. In contrast, investments and prots in the traded
sectors are squeezed by the oil boom. As the non-traded goods sectors ex-
pand, the traded goods sectors of these countries tend to shrink.
On the other hand, Cuddington [10] emphasises the issues related to the
eects of the spending policy implemented by the public sector. According
to this author, poor management of oil wealth and, in particular, inecient
spending by the public sector induces signicant imbalances in the internal
market.
Hausmann and Rigobon [11] argue that distorted allocations of spending
over time by the public sector are enhanced in the presence of common-pool
problems or uncertainty over property rights over the resource income. This
fact, in turn, may further enhance low economic performances. Fasano-Filho
and Iqbal [12], in an analysis of how to improve economic performance of
the Gulf Council Countries, suggest to reallocate oil wealth in such a way to
improve economic incentives directed at boosting the growth of the private
sector.
Similarly, studies by Barnett and Ossowski [13], Eifert et al. [14], Leigh and
Olters [15], among others, are interested in the operational aspects of s-
cal policy in oil producing countries. These works oer indications on scal
policy adjustments in order to reduce the negative eects on sustainable eco-
nomic growth arising from high volatile and uncertain 
ows of oil revenues
from abroad.
The reallocation eects of booms in resource revenues aect also oil import-
ing countries. Several papers argue that oil price shocks often require an
unusual amount of labour to be reallocated across industries of developed
economies, thereby increasing the unemployment rate in those periods.
Lilien [16] contends that reallocative shocks signicantly aect aggregate un-
employment by increasing the amount of labour reallocation required. Ac-
cording to Loungani [17], macroeconomic models typically assign primary
importance to aggregate demand shocks in the determination of the unem-
ployment rate. This re
ects the belief that shocks to the composition of
demand merely lead to a reallocation of labour resources across industries.
This evidence nds empirical support in Hamilton [18], who shows that oil
prices Granger-cause unemployment.
Davis and Haltiwanger H. [19] argue that factor specialization and realloca-
tion frictions led to reduced output and employment in the US economy in
the wake of the rst oil price shock (1973). During that experience, sectors
4like the car industry were particularly hit, as their actual features of factor
inputs did not closely match the desired characteristics.3
In Lee and Ni [20] Vector Autoregression models are used to investigate how
dierent sectors of the US economy are aected by oil shocks. Results of im-
pulse response functions indicate that oil price increases mainly reduce supply
for high energy-intensive industries. On the other hand, oil price shocks af-
fect many other industries (such as the car industry) by reducing demand
for their products. According to Keane and Prasad [21], oil prices shocks are
associated with variations in employment shares and relative wages across
industries. Results suggest that, while real wages declines for all workers,
wages for skilled workers increase.
This paper aims at providing further evidence on the eects of exogenous
oil shocks on the macroeconomic performances of oil exporting countries. It
does so by means of a simple theoretical framework based on the real business
cycle (RBC) modelling of macroeconomic activity in oil producing countries.
The questions we would like to answer can be summarized as follows. How
are oil shocks likely to aect the economic activity of oil exporting countries?
More specically, what are the eects of oil shocks and expansionary scal
policy on consumption, investments and labour markets? Do oil shocks in-
crease the role of the public sector in the economy4? How important are
changes in the allocation of production inputs across sectors in determining
the economic consequences to an expansion of government consumption ex-
penditure?5
3For instance, the auto industry and the network of dealership were specialized, re-
spectively, in the production and sale of large cars. Similarly, skills of workers in the auto
industry and research and design activities were directed at producing and engineering
large cars. However, the demand of this type of cars dropped as oil prices increased after
the oil shocks.
4In the present paper, the words government and public sector are used interchangeably.
5Shifts in demand across sectors induced by changes in public spending is well docu-
mented in literature. For instance, Ramey and Shapiro [22] examine the eects of changes
in public spending on the reallocation of production factor in a two-sector dynamic gen-
eral equilibrium model. Under the assumption that changes in public spending are ofthen
sector-specic, shifts in the allocation of factors across industries can lead to declines in
employment and changes in the wages paid across sectors.
5This paper extends the previous literature on the macroeconomic eects of
exogenous oil shocks on the economic stance of oil exporting countries in
various directions. The hypothesis that oil price shocks drive large aggregate
reallocation of production factor is investigated by several previous studies.
However, earlier work lacks the sectoral detail on job creation and destruction
that we examine. In other words, our theory can be view as an attempt to
describe the Dutch disease that often aects oil producing nations by means
of a RBC modelling.
In addition, dierently from this literature, our analysis focuses on the sec-
toral reallocation adjustment process that follows a negative wealth eect
induced by an exogenous oil shock. In particular, a two-sector economy in
which the public sector role is separately considered from the role of private
rms is considered.
Many assumptions of our analysis are similar to those considered in the work
on the cyclical eects of scal policy when investment in public capital is
allowed for (see, inter alia, Finn [23] and Lansing [24]). Nevertheless, the
focus is quite dierent.6 We concentrate on the mechanism of transmission
of exogenous oil shocks on producing countries, whereas Finn [23] considers
the dierent eects of government scal policy on both private and public
sectors for the US economy.
Finally, this paper derives some analytical conditions of scal policy under
which the negative economic eects of shocks to oil revenues and government
consumption expenditure are reduced. Implications of scal policies aimed
at reducing the so-called natural resource curse are, hence, presented.
We focus our attention on annual data for major oil producing countries. In
particular, economic data referring to the Gulf Cooperating Council (GCC)
countries of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are examined. One of the most important fea-
tures of this organization is that its member countries own the largest world's
proven oil reserves. According to British Petroleum data referring to the end
of 2009, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates
possess approximately 37.2% of world's oil proven reserves. Saudi Arabia,
6Several assumptions of the theoretical model also dier signicantly with respect to
this paper. The main dierences involves the source of exogenous growth, the functional
form taken by government budget constraint, the role of the public sector in the economy
as far as productive activities are concerned.
6in particular, is the world's largest oil producer with approximately 19.8%
of total world's oil reserves (or 265 billion barrels). Despite diversication
eorts in government expenditure growth, particularly in the past few years,
in GCC countries governments still account for about 40 percent of overall
aggregate demand, one of the highest share in the world.7
The model is calibrated to an \average" oil exporting country in order to
describe the eects of government activity in aecting its economic perfor-
mances. Its rough quantitative consistency with second moments of the data
is, then, examined. In order to examine the eects of exogenous shocks on
our simplied economy, the eects of one positive percent shock to oil rev-
enues and government consumption expenditure on relevant variables are,
hence, examined and discussed.
One of the main results we obtain is that oil shocks cause a reallocation of
economic activities between the private and public sectors of the economy.
In particular, higher oil revenues seems to cause a crowding-out eects on
both private consumption and investment.8
In fact, higher investments by the public sector are associated with reduc-
tions in the process of accumulation of capital by the private sector of the
country. Although the estimated impact on demand for labour supply in the
public sector is positive, supply for private labour decreases. As the eect
on the private sector outpaces that on the private sector, the overall unem-
ployment rate of the economy increases, nevertheless, increases. All in all,
while the role of the public sector in the economy expands, the importance
of the private sector lessens out. However, since this latter eect tends to
be larger with respect to the former, the impact of exogenous oil shocks on
total output is argued to be negative.
A shock to government consumption expenditure has as its main eect to in-
crease economy's wealth. In fact, despite the fact that more of the economy's
goods are consumed by the government, private investments, employment
7Source: our elaborations on World Bank's data (World Development Indicators, 2010)
and Penn's World Tables data.
8According to Aschauer [25], the increase of the stock of public capital causes positive
eects on both the national investment rate and the return to private capital. If follows
that higher investments by the public sector have a direct impact on the process of accu-
mulation of private capital.
7and overall production respond positively to an expansionary scal policy.
In addition, a shock to government consumption impacts negatively the level
of public investments and the level of public capital. However, as employ-
ment in the public sector increases signicantly in response to a shock in
government expenditure, public output expands. Finally, our model predicts
an instantaneous negative eect on total investments and on the stock of
capital in the economy. Nevertheless, driven by an expansion of the number
of employees in the economy, total output increases as a consequence of ex-
pansionary scal policy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model
employed in order to examine the macroeconomic eects of oil shocks in
oil exporting countries. In particular, Section 2.1 outlines the assumptions
of the framework employed in our analysis, while Section 2.2 considers the
set-up of our theoretical model. Section 3 investigates the consequences of
disturbances to oil revenues to key macroeconomic variables. Sections 3.1
and 3.2 describe the framework implemented in order to calibrate model and
the main results referring to the simulation of the RBC model. Section 3.3
outlines the main results of one percent oil and government consumption
expenditure shock on relevant variables of both public and private sectors.
Section 3.4 discusses how results varies if dierent assumptions on key pa-
rameters and steady-state ratios are made. Section 4 concludes.
2. The theoretical model
2.1. Assumptions
The eects of exogenous oil shocks on the economic performance of oil
exporting countries are studied by means of a simple neoclassical growth
model where preferences, technology and resource constraints for both private
and public agents are considered together with rules governing public nance.
Households, rms and the government interact in a variety of ways within a
perfectly competitive market structure.
Households
There is a representative household which aims at maximizing a dis-
counted sum of period utilities over an innite planning horizon. The house-
hold has preferences over sequences of consumption and leisure and maxi-






tut (Ct; Lt; Gt) (1)
where E0 represents the expected value operator. Ct and Gt represent, re-
spectively, private and public consumption, while Lt denotes leisure.
According to this equation, future momentary utilities, ut, are discounted
using the subjective discount factor ,  2 (0; 1):
The fully parameterized momentary utility function employed in this study
is given by:













where  and # denote preference parameters. In particular,  > 1 is the
inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption whereas,  
is a parameter denoting the degree of substitutability between private and
public consumption expenditure. According to this period utility function,
government consumption expenditure provides utility for the household, as
it represents a substitute for private consumption.9 It can be easily veried
that utility depends positively on consumption services and leisure. Further-
more, it can be observed that vL < 0 and vLL > 010 where v(Lt) = L
1 #
t ,
# > 0. In other words, v(:) is a decreasing and convex function of leisure. As-
suming constant leisure, these features of the momentary utility function are
compatible with steady-state growth in consumption. Thus, the specication
of the period utility function we employ ensures positive rst and negative
second derivatives of the utility function with respect to consumption levels,
i.e. uC > 0, uCC < 0, uG > 0, uGG < 0, that is utility is an increasing and
concave function in both private and public consumption.
The household has a time endowment which is normalized to one. The sum of
time devoted to work and leisure cannot exceed its endowment of time. Con-
sequently, labour supply Nt and leisure Lt are related through the following
9This assumption follows Finn [23].
10vX and vXX denote, respectively, rst and negative second derivatives of function
v(X) with respect to X.
9time constraint:11
Lt + Nt = 1 (3)




t + t  Ct + I
P
t (4)
where Wt is the real wage rate, Rt is the real rental rate on capital, IP
t is
gross private investment and t the rm's prot. According to equation (4)
total income earned by the household has to be greater (or, at least, equal)
to its total spending.
The household owns a stock of capital (KP
t ) which is rented to the representa-













where P 2 [0; 1] is the rate of depreciation of private capital. K0 is assumed
to be constant.
The household chooses sequences fCt; Nt; Kt+1g
1
t=0 to maximize the in-
tertemporal utility function (1) subject to the 
ow budget constraint (4) and






















where t is the Lagrange multiplier associated to equation (4).




: t = uC (Ct; Gt; Nt) (6)


























t = 0 (9)




t+1 = 0: (10)
Firms
Households own a single rm that produced (private) output Y P
t accord-



















 2 (0;1) (11)
where  2 (0; 1). With this technology the rm employ two factors of pro-
duction: the per capita stock of private capital, KP
t , and the per capita
labour supply, NP
t . The Cobb-Douglas production function (11) is charac-
terized by constant returns to scale with respect to NP and KP.



























Behaviour aimed at prot maximization implies that the marginal product of
each factor has to be set equal to its user cost. Hence, equilibrium conditions

























or, if we consider equation (11):14















Finally, there is a government which hires labour from households, NG
t
and invests a fraction of its revenues in order to produce government out-
put. In addition, it purchases consumption goods from the market. In other
words, intervention of scal policy in the economic system is assumed to
take several forms: purchases of consumption goods, investments in produc-
tive activities and compensation for public employees.
The government has only one sources of revenues: it owns a 
ow endowment
of a natural resource commodity (in our case, oil), whose value in each period
12By simple substitution of equations (13) and (14) into equation (12) we obtain that
total prots are equal to zero.
13Since, in this paper, we focus on the eects on busincess cycle movements of relevant
variables of exogenous oil shocks we abstract from technological progress. In that follows,
At is, therefore, constrainted to be equal to one.
14The equations which result from the optimization problem of households
and rms can be summarized by the following \implementability constraint":
E0
P
t=0 t fuC (Ct; Gt; Nt)Ct + uN (Ct; Gt; Nt)Ntg   uC(C0; G0; N0)R0KP
0 = 0






  P + 1.
12t is given by Zt.15
Public output (Y G























 2 (0;1) (15)
where NG
t and Kt
G are the stock of labour and capital employed by the
government for production purposes and At denotes total production aug-
menting technological progress. In equation (15), constant returns to scale
over (public) capital and labour are assumed.16
Government's investment increases the capital stock KG subject to the fol-













t denotes (exogenous) gross public investment and G 2 [0; 1] is the
rate of depreciation of public capital.17
In each period, the government faces the following budget constraint:





where Zt denotes the 
ow of exogenous oil revenues the government obtains
from abroad, respectively.
15Although this seems to be a strong assumption, we need to remember that, for GCC
countries, oil accounts for a very high percentage of government's revenues and exports
earnings. In addition, these countries are almost tax-free economies (see Razzak and Labas
[26]). According to World Bank's data (World Development Indicators, 2010), for these
countries as a whole, in 2007 fuel exports accounted for approximately 55 percent of GDP
and 83 percent of total merchandise exports.
16Since in our analysis we focus on innovation caused by shocks in exogenous oil revenues
and government consumption expenditure we abstract from the eects of the technical
progress on the trend growth in the economy. Therefore, At is assumed constant and
equal to one.
17Please notice that, the private sector is not renting out capital to the government sec-
tor. On the contrary, here, KG
t is exogenously supplied by the government. Consequently,
the price of the capital does not alter its budget constraint (equation 17) (see Lansing [24]
and Finn [23]).
13According to equation (17), the total amount of resources used by the govern-
ment for purchases of consumption goods, investments and compensation for
public employees can not exceed total external revenues. The possibility to
dierentiate between government's purchases of consumption and investment
goods enable us to assess the relative importance of the dierent mechanisms
of transmission of the scal policy. In particular, we are able to distinguish
between the utility eects which arise from government's purchases and the
eects on sectoral reallocation of employment and investments determined
by the productive decisions by the public sector .
Government's scal policy responds to the stance of world's economy sum-
marized by changes in oil prices. Consequently, a quantitative analysis of
the response of scal policy decisions (in particular, government investments
and employment) to exogenous oil 
uctuations has to be employed. Thus,
we will be able to evaluate whether these components are positively or neg-
atively related to the business cycle of oil producing countries.
The quantitative analysis considered in this paper necessarily requires the
specication of the process followed by the exogenous variables Zt and Gt.
The stochastic processes for prices and production levels are combined into
a single process which is described by the following formula:18
Zt = (1   Z)logZ + ZlogZt 1 + Z; t (18)
where Z < 1 and Z; t denotes shocks to Zt and Z; t is distributed according
to a N(0;2
Z) process. In other words, the variable Zt evolves according to
an AR(1) process (autoregressive process of order 1).
Similarly, we assume that government consumption expenditure evolves ac-
cording to the following AR(1) process:
Gt = (1   G)logG + GlogGt 1 + G; t (19)
here G < 1 and shocks to Gt (G; t) are distributed according to a N(0;2
G)
process.
Finally, by combining the government budget constraint (17) with the house-
hold budget constraint (4), the following economy-wide constraint is ob-
18This assumption is similar to that adopted by Smith and McCardle [27] which consid-
ered for oil revenues the following process: dx(t) = xx(t)dt + xx(t)dzx(t) where dzx(t)
are increments of a standard Brownian motion process.
14tained:
Ct + It + Gt  Yt (20)
where It = IP
t + IG
t .19
According to equations (17) and (20), consumption and investments by pri-
vate and public agents and compensation for public employees by the public
sector completely absorb the economy's resources.20
2.2. The Ramsey equilibrium
The equilibrium of the economy is obtained when the representative rm
and representative household solve their optimization problems, the public
sector satises its budget constraint and all markets clear. The rational
expectations equilibrium consists of the sequences of endogenous variables
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equation 4 yields Y P
t +WtNG
t = Ct +It which when substituted into equation 20 implies
that the resources are equal to the sum of Y P
t and Zt.
20In that follows the resource constraint (20) is used in place of the government budget
constraint (17) since the two equations are not independent.
15where Xt = fKt; It; Nt; Ytg.
Equations (21) and (22) give the outcome of the maximizing behaviour by
rms. According to these expressions, equilibrium is guaranteed when the
marginal productivities of labour and capital equals their marginal costs.
Equation (23) represents the household intratemporal eciency condition
governing its labour supply and investment. This equation tells us that
the marginal rate of substitution between labour and consumption must be
equal to the marginal product of labour. On the other hand, equation (24)
establishes the intertemporal eciency condition, that is the Euler equation
rst-order condition. At equilibrium, the marginal cost, in terms of utility,
of investing in more capital should be equal to the expected marginal utility
gain.
Finally, the set of equations (25) shows that capital, labour and output mar-
kets clear when the sum of private and public labour and production equals
total supply.
Other conditions to be satised are given by the laws of motion for KP and
KG (equations 5 and 16), production functions by the private and public
sectors (equations 11 and 15), the government budget constraint (equation
17), the process representing the behavior of exogenous shocks (equations 18
and 19), and the economy-wide constraint (equation 20).
3. Solution of the model
3.1. Calibration
The model's cyclical implications are explorated by means of a quanti-
tative analysis based on the solution of the theoretical economic model pre-
sented in Section 2. In this Section the calibration of the theoretical model
is presented. According to the procedure proposed by Kydland and Prescott
[28], values are to be assigned to the model's parameters and steady-state
variables.21
Our main objective is to provide information on the eects of exogenous oil
shocks on the economic performances of a number of oil producing countries.
21In steady-state, since no trend growth in exogenous variable is assumed, all variables
take constant values. This implies the absence of uncertainty. In this representation of
the model economy, variables tend to 
uctuate around the values given by this path.
16The values of model's parameters and steady-state variables are, hence, cho-
sen to t information on the Gulf Cooperating Council countries of Bahrain,
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia. These countries share a set of important features. As all these
economies are almost tax-free, they depend for an important fraction of their
revenues on rents obtained by exporting oil (and, also, natural gas) to the
developed economies. In other words, they are rent-economies that distribute
resources in proportion to the hydrocarbon revenues they receive.
Data from widely recognized organizations and institutions (namely, U.S.
Department of Energy - Energy Information Administration - World Bank -
World Development Indicators, 2010 - United Nations - International Labour
Organization - International Monetary Fund - International Financial Statis-
tics, October 2010 - and University of Pennsylvania - Penn's World Tables)
are employed at the purpose of calibrating the model to the economic per-
formances of the GCC countries.22
According to Stockman and Tesar [29] we assign to the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution of consumption () a value equal to 2 whereas the rate
of time preference () is set equal to 0.96. As our benchmark case, we in-
troduce an imperfect degree of substitutability between private and public
consumption expenditure (that is,   = 1).
In addition, we assume a steady-state allocation of 80 percent of the time
endowment to leisure and 20 percent to work eeort. This value is consistent
with an intertemporal elasticity of substitution in leisure (#) equal to 4.17.23
Similarly, in the present study, values for preference parameters  and 
 are
equal to the values used in previous quantitative studies (0:30, see, for in-
stance, Finn [30]).
In order to examine the responses of the economic performance of a repre-
sentative oil producing country to a shock in oil revenues and government
consumption expenditure, steady-state ratios are obtained by considering the
average values of the statistics for the countries considered in the analysis
22However, it is worth observing that, for these countries, statistics are often not reliable
as they vary signicantly across countries as far as quality, measurement, coverage of data
is concerned. Statistics on economic data are also not regularly collected.
23Since to our own knowledge, no reliable statistics referring to these parameters for
GCC countries is available, this parameter is selected on the basis of previous literature.
17(see Table 1). In particular, shares of consumption and investment in total
output from the Penn's World Tables for the GCC countries provide the val-
ues of C
Y and I
Y reported in columns two and three of Table 1.24 Similarly,
column four of Table 1 shows the steady-state ratio Z=Y (share of hydrocar-
bon revenues in GDP) for all countries examined computed by using World
Bank statistics.
The values for the depreciation rates P and G (respectively 0.097 and
0.0285) are chosen in order for the economy's steady-state private and public
investment-to-output ratios (I=Y and X=Y ) to coincide with the average
values observed for the GCC countries (that is, 0.21 and 0.07, respectively).
Accordingly, we are able to set the steady-state ratios KP=K and Y P=Y to
be equal to 0.46 and 0.63, respectively. 25.
Finally, based on statistics based on International Labour Organization data
the percentage of workers employed in the public sector on total employees
on average is equal approximately to 0:30.
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
24In what follows, constant steady-state values of relevant variables are denoted by
employing symbols without the time subscript.
25Equations (5) and (16) implies that investment in the steady-state is given by Ii =
i Ki where i = fP; Gg. The steady-state capital stock of the private sector is given by:




K  YP=KP = (R   1 + P)= (B)
If we solve eq. A to obtain Y P
K we get the following equation:
Y P
K = NP=exp( log(KP=NP)  )=KP (C).
If we substitute C in B and solve for KP we get:
KP = exp(log((R   1 + P)=)=( 1 + ))  NP
where R = 1=. A similar process is followed to determine KG. Values for parameters
P and G are, then, chosen such that the resulting ratio IP=IG satises the steady-state
level reported in Table 4 (in our example three).
18At the purpose of replicating the responses of a representative oil producing
country, the parameters of autocorrelation process of the shock processes em-
ployed coincide with the values obtained by estimating AR(1) processes for
oil revenues and government consumption expenditure for each GCC country.
Based on simple regression analysis based on Energy Information Adminis-
tration, International Monetary Fund and World Bank data (see Table 2)
we obtain as estimates for Z, G, Z and G average values equal to 0.86,
0.86, 0.22 and 0.09, respectively - see Table 3. These results suggest that the
goverment consumption expenditure shows lower variability in coecient es-
timates with respect to oil revenues. In addition, goverment consmption in
Kuwait displays a smaller degree of autocorrelation than its counterparts. In
fact, notice that the sample used in our analysis includes the experience of
the rst Persian Gulf war. Finally, according to our results, we are able to
assume that there is not correlation between the two exogenous shocks (that
is, corr(Z; G) = 0).
[INSERT TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE]
Table 4 shows all parameters and steady-state values for the relevant vari-
ables used in calibrating the model to represent our \average" oil producing
country.
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
3.2. Simulation
The behaviour of relevant variables over 1000 samples is simulated over
annual data by using the system of linear equations obtained from the solu-
tion of our theoretical framework (see Section 2.2). Since we have a set of
both linear and nonlinear equations, in order to solve for the system we need
to approximate it by a corresponding set of linear equations. In particular,
all equations that represent the Ramsey equilibrium have to be log-linearized
around the non-stochastic steady-state of the economy using standard meth-
ods for linear dynamic equations (see, King et al. [31]).26
Each sample generated had the same number of periods (30) as the time
26The system of linear equations obtained by considering the assumptions of our the-
oretical model together with the momentary utility function of the household given by
equation 2 are available from the authors upon request.
19series employed in the study. The recursive method proposed by Binder and
Pesaran [32] and the Hodrick-Prescott technique are employed, respectively,
to simulate the model and to lter the models samples.
Tables 5 and 6 shows the statistical properties of the economies examined in
the present study as summarized by a set of standard deviations and correla-
tions with output. In the rst panel of Table 5 we report the statistics for the
GCC economies. The second column in the second panel of the table shows
the standard deviations of our \average" oil exporting country whereas the
statistics which describe the economy resulting from our model are reported
in the third column.
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
When the statistics based on actual data and those obtained by simulating
our economy are compared it can be noticed that both displays signicantly
larger 
uctuations for private consumption, government consumption and
oil revenues with respect to output. On the contrary, our model produces
simulated data for labour that are characterized by smaller 
uctuations with
respect to actual data. On the contrary, 
uctuations of simulated data for
investment are larger than those associated to actual data.27
Table 6 shows the correlation of relevant variables with output. On the basis
of actual data, statistics are shown for each oil producing country considered
in the analysis as well as our \average" oil exporting country (rst panel
and column two in the second panel, respectively). Table 7 presents the se-
lected autocorrelations of the simulated series calculated from the estimated
spectral density matrix.
[INSERT TABLES 6 AND 7 ABOUT HERE]
Both the actual data and the theoretical model predict that the consumption,
labour and government consumption are correlated positively with output.
On the contrary, the level of total investments as well oil revenues in the
model is countercyclical, that is, the correlation of these variables with Yt
is less than zero. The negative correlation between oil revenues and output
27These results needs, however, to be interpreted with caution because of the small
number of observations employed in our analysis as well as measurement errors that may
aect ocial statistics. See note 22.
20arises from the assumed correlation of oil revenues and employment rates
observed both in simulated data (see Section ) and in previous studies. In
fact, since the mid-1980s, in these countries, economic growth has deceler-
ated while conditions in the labour markets have worsened (see, Fasano-Filho
and Goyal [33]).
Results from the simulation of the RBC model for the GCC countries sug-
gests that Ct, Nt and Gt are important \inverted"28 leading indicators of
output, that is there exists a negative relationship between vt (here, vt =
Ct; Nt; Gt; Zt) and Yt (that is, corr(vt;yt+2) < 0.
3.3. Quantitative results
This Section presents the main intuition on how oil shocks and scal pol-
icy aect the economic performances of oil exporting countries. In particular,
we discuss the key qualitative eects of one-time innovations to each of our
two exogenous variables: Z and G. Table 8 summarizes the eects of the
two shocks on both private and public sectors.
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE]
Eects of exogenous oil shocks
Figures 1 to 5 show the percent deviation from steady-state which results
from a one percent change in oil revenues.
A positive innovation shock to oil revenues is argued to cause an instanta-
neous increase in investments by the government. Similarly, as a result of the
increase in oil revenues, both employment in the public sector and demand
of capital by the government strongly increase.
This result matches the historical experience of GCC countries (see, for in-
stance, Fasano-Filho and Wang [35], Fasano-Filho and Wang [36] and Fasano-
Filho and Iqbal [12]). These countries, in fact, often associate increases in
oil revenues with an expansionary scal policy. In particular, government
spending rises in tandem with oil revenues often through a massive invest-
ment program in infrastructure. While in the region the expansion of public
capital positively impacted the economic performances of these countries,
in other resource-rich countries revenues from booms were mostly consumed
rather than invested. For these economies, commodity booms have usually
28See King and Watson [34].
21resulted in slower economic growth over the medium term (see Sachs and
Warner [2]).
In addition, results suggest that the oil shock reduces the productivity of
private capital and discourages more investment by the private sector. In
fact, it can be noticed that, because of increases in interest rates, the process
of accumulation of capital by the private sector slows signicantly.
However, because of the positive eect of the oil shock on the stock of public
capital, the total capital endowment of the economy starts increasing after
approximately six years from the oil shock. This eect is well known in the
existing literature on the \natural resource curse" (see, for instance, Auty
and Gelb [37] and Eifert et al. [14]). In fact, mainly because of a high level
of non-wage income (e.g. social spending and low taxes) the abundance of
natural resources is often associated with negative eects on incentives by
economic agents to accumulate capital (in particular, human capital).
Total labour market dynamics over the business cycle are mainly explained
by the positive eects of oil shocks on the supply of labour in the public
sector and its average productivity.29
Nevertheless, it is worth noticing that the exogenous increase in external
revenues received by the government produces an important sectoral real-
location between the private and public sector. In particular, the oil shock
causes a transfer of labour from the private to the government sector: while
oil revenues boost the number of employees in the public sector, employment
in the private sector responds negatively to the oil shock.
All in all, although the number of employees in sectors like defence, public
administration and health increases, total employment decreases signicantly
driven by lower employment rates in the private sector.30
With regard to the consequences of the oil shocks on total output, oil rev-
29The magnitude of the increases in employment is strongly related to the size of
marginal productivity of factors in the two sectors. The diminishing marginal product
of labour in the public production function determines the reallocation of factor across
sector.
30Rising unemployment in GCC countries is studied, for instance, in Fasano-Filho and
Goyal [33]. In particular, they notice that in these countries the private sector employs a
signicant number of workers. However, during the period 1996-2000 \the public sector
has continued to account for more than three-fourths of employment growth in Kuwait
and about one-half in Saudi Arabia."
22enues increase the role of the government in the economy. In fact, according
to the reduction in employment and in the stock of capital in the private
sector, private output falls signicantly. On the other hand, public output
strongly increases.
Finally, the simulation of our model suggests that the oil shock has an overall
negative eect on economic performances of oil exporting countries. A likely
explanation of this evidence lies in the fact that the number of employees in
the economy responds negatively to higher oil revenues.
In addition, the results of our simulation exercise support the view that an
oil shock is also associated with decreases of both wages and private con-
sumption. Because of the eects of the oil shock on total employment, a
rise in government spending does determine the usual crowding-out eects
on private demand for consumption goods.31
[INSERT FIGURES 1 TO 5 ABOUT HERE]
Eects of shocks to government consumption expenditure
The main eect of a shock to government consumption expenditure on
oil producing economies is a positive wealth eect. In fact, although more of
the economy's goods are consumed by the government, a positive innovation
to G causes an increase in private consumption. The main explanation for
this relationship is that higher expenditure by the government causes pri-
vate employment to expand. Employment increases also as a consequence of
higher wages. As the increase of private employment raises capital's future
marginal productivity and interest rates fall, the incentive to invest by the
private sector increases as well. Finally, with regard to the impact to output,
since investments boost the level of the capital stock, a shock to G is argued
to have a strong positive impact on private production.
As far as the eects on the public sector are concerned, Figure 6 shows that
a shock to government consumption impacts negatively the level of public
investments. In other words, spending practices aimed at increasing govern-
ment consumption could reduce incentives to the accumulation of (physical
31Similarly, in an analysis of the eects of scal policy in advanced countries, Gali
et al. [38] describes the dierent responses that aect government expenditure in advanced
economies. He argues that the crowding-out eects of consumption in response to a rise
in government spending is due to the full-
exibility of prices and (or) the intertemporal
optimization problem faced by households.
23as well as human) capital by the public sector.
Over time, the reduction in IG
t causes the level of public capital to decrease.
However, employment in the public sector increases signicantly in the rst
six years after the shock.32 As the reduction in the stock of public capital is
more than compensated by the expansion of public employment, public out-
put responds positively to a shock in government expenditure. However, as
the eects on public employment decrease over time, the overall eect of the
shock on public output becomes negative after approximately three years.
As we have seen, the accumulation of private and public capital move in
opposite directions. As the decrease in public investment is more important
than the changes that aect the private sector, the overall instantaneous ef-
fect on total investments is argued to be negative. Similarly, the negative
eect of the shock to G on the level of public capital is not compensated by
a corresponding increase in the stock of private capital. Consequently, the
model predicts a negative eect of a shock on government consumption on
the total stock of capital. In addition, increases in wages are argued to have
no particular eects on total labour. Total employment increases despite the
reduction in the number of employees in the public sector. Finally, because
of the combined eects of the shock on private and public production, the
model asserts that expansionary scal policy has a positive impact on total
output despite decreases in capital expenditure.33; 34
32As Fasano-Filho and Wang [35] notice for GCC countries, oil booms enhance the \role
of the government as the main provider of jobs for nationals".
33Previous theoretical and empirical literature shows that increases in capital expen-
diture will either raise or lower economic growth. This eect depends on several factors
such as the size of the government, how the scal policy is nanced, whether or not the
public capital \crowds-out" private investments. For instance, Devarajan et al. [39] argue
that, often because of excessive expenditure, the relationship between public expenditure
on capital and per capita growth of developing economies is negative. On the contrary,
Munnell [40] nd that public investments have a signicant, positive impact on output. In
fact, the positive eects on employment growth and on the productivity of private capital
tend to oset the possibility that crowding out eects on private investment emerge.
34According to other studies (see Barro [41]) an increase in government consumption
leads to a lower economic growth rate as a higher level taxation is not associated with an
increase in the productivity of the private sector.
24[INSERT FIGURES 6 TO 10 ABOUT HERE]
3.4. Sensitivity analysis
In this Section the sensitivities of the results to overall oil shocks on our
economy to changes in key parameters with respect to those presented in
Table 4 are explored. Two simulation exercises are, thus, considered. In the
rst exercise, the results on the simulation exercise are presented by con-
sidering how results changes as parameter   varies. That is, by considering
dierent positive eects arising to households from dierent type of scal
policy. In the second exercise, dierent assumptions on the size of govern-
ments are considered. In this case, results are displayed by simulating our
model under the assumption of dierent steady-state values for C+IP
Y , that
is, the ratio between private demand for consumption and investments and
output.
How does the economy responds to a positive oil shocks if the utility function
of households is assumed to depend on government consumption? How do
these responses depend on the values assumed by parameter  ? As we have
seen from equation (2), parameter   represents the degree of substitutability
between private and public consumption in the utility function of the repre-
sentative agent. Consequently, by decreasing   the degree of substitutability
between G and C increases.
Tables 9 and 10 shows standard deviations of simulated series and their corre-
lations with output assuming dierent values of parameter  . Table 9 shows
that as   decreases, 
uctuations of all economic variables increases. On the
contrary, changes in the degree of substitutability of private with public con-
sumption aect signicantly the cyclical characteristics of simulated series
(see Table 10). In particular, lower values of   have as their main eects to
make total investments and capital procyclical. Moreover, while the degree
of correlation of private investment and output increases, the negative rela-
tionship between public investments and output, as well as that between oil
revenues and output, strengthens.
In this subsection the model economy is simulated under the counterfactual
assumptions that the size of the public sector is dierent with respect to the
that can be observed in an average oil exporting countries. In particular,
Tables 11 and 12 show how results vary if changes on the assumptions on the
25size of the public sector of oil exporting countries are made.35 As the role of
the government in the economy increases, 
uctuations of total output, con-
sumption and labour decrease. The most noticeable result of the sensitivity
analysis shows that, as the role of the private sector decreases, the degree of
correlation between oil revenues and output increases.
Moreover, results shown in Table 12 suggest that the correlation between
output and private investment (or capital) decreases as the role of the govern-
ment in the economy increases. On the other hand, the relationship between
investments by the government and output falls.
[INSERT TABLES 11 AND 12 ABOUT HERE]
All in all, the possibility to reduce the negative eects of exogenous oil shocks
on the economic growth of oil exporting countries are guaranteed under cer-
tain assumptions on key parameters. When compared to the results obtained
by simulating the benchmark economy (see Figures 11-10), Figures 11-14 al-
low us to assess the eects of the alterations in parameter values on total
investments, capital, labour and output.
As the degree of substitutability between public and private consumption
increases, the overall eects associated to an exogenous oil shock decrease.
This suggests that governments in GCC countries may reduce the negative
eects by providing consumption goods (or public services, like health) that
enter more directly in the utility function of households.
Finally, our exercise of simulation suggests that, after an exogenous oil shock,
countries which are characterized by a smaller size of governments in steady-
state tend to react more signicantly to oil price shocks. Moreover, our
results do support the possibility that the negative economic eects from an
oil shock can hardly be reduced by decreasing the direct (i.e. productive)
intervention of government in the productive activities of the country. The
negative eects do not decrease proportionally when the size of governments
in these economies is reduced. Furthermore, in countries with smaller gov-
ernments, expansionary scal policy is associated to higher positive eects
on total investments and, consequently, on ouput.
[INSERT FIGURES 11 AND 14 ABOUT HERE]
35In particular, the ratio (C +IP)=Y is assumed to take the following values: 0.67, 0.64
(benchmark case), 0.58, 0.51 and 0,45.
264. Concluding remarks
Exogenous oil shocks are often argued to negatively aect the economic
stance of producing countries. The main thesis we present in this paper is
that, in order to evaluate the impact on the economic performances of an
oil producing country, a researcher must address the negative wealth eects
and the reallocation process caused by the scal policy implemented by the
government.
Through a simple RBC model we assess that oil price shocks can imply a
strong negative wealth eect on the private sector. Because of the shift of
productive factors from the households and rms to the government sector,
private employment and output respond negatively to the oil shock. In other
words, a crowding-out eect on private investment arises as a consequence
of the net wealth eect due to changes in oil revenues. Moreover, since the
negative eects on private investment, output and employment are not com-
pensated by the positive impact which derives from the employment policy
by the government, 
uctuations of oil revenues cause overall output to shrink.
With regard to the eects of a shock to government consumption expenditure,
results from the simulation of our model suggest that private employment
responds positively to an expansionary scal policy. Similarly, as higher in-
vestments by the private sector increase and the level of both capital and
employment in the private sector expands, private production is positively
aected by a shock to government expenditure.
Moreover, a shock to government consumption has a negative impact on
the level of public investments and, consequently, the stock of public capital
to decrease. However, as employment in the public sector increases sig-
nicantly, public output temporarily expands after the expansionary policy
implemented by the government.
In sum, total investments and capital decrease after the shock. However, to-
tal employment increases despite the reduction in the number of employees
in the public sector. This fact allows total output to increase in response to
a shock to government consumption expenditure.
In summary, according to the results of our model and previous studies36,
GCC countries should reduce the adverse eects of abrupt shifts in oil rev-
36See, for instance, Fasano-Filho and Wang [35] Fasano-Filho and Wang [36] and Fasano-
Filho and Iqbal [12].
27enues on the structure of their economies. At this regard, scal policy should
be aimed at preventing the role of the private sector from shrinking exces-
sively. Controls on investments by the private sector in oil producing coun-
tries have recently been signicantly reduced. However, constraints on the
possibility by private agents to operate in these countries continue to hinder
economic growth. At this purpose, measures directed at reducing restrictive
domestic trade and competition practices37 should be implemented to sup-
port privatizations of domestic sectors. Similarly, the establishment of a well
functioning competitive market system, a proper denition of property rights
and the development of a more ecient regulatory framework represent pos-
sible measures that governments in oil exporting countries should pursue in
order to open nancial markets to foreign investors.
This paper faces several questions with regard to the implementation of s-
cal policy in oil exporting countries. However, our analysis could be enriched
along several directions. In particular, future research could be aimed at
formulating additional guidelines for government spending decisions which
arise from the 
ow of oil revenues. In order for producing nations to reduce
the negative eects arising from the high volatility and uncertainty of oil rev-
enues, according to Barnett and Ossowski [13], the government should target
the non-oil balance. The accumulation of nancial wealth over the period of
oil production could enable producing countries to face in a proper manner
the challenges arising from oil shocks. The introduction of these aspects in
a more complete theoretical framework represents an interesting topic for
future studies.
37As well as to enhance the process of economic liberalization of domestic sectors.
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Average (6) 42.34% 21.08%
Country Z=Y IG=Y NG=N
(2), (3) (2), (4) (5)
Bahrain 60.38% 4.14% 25.30%
(2005-2007) (2006-2008) (2001)
Kuwait 52.92% 5.56% 23.80%
(2006-2007) (2005-2006) (2003)
Oman 53.92% 8.87% 64.40%
(2005-2008) (2005-2006) (2000)
Qatar 53.24% 7.27% 16.40%
(2005-2007) (2005) (2006)
Saudi Arabia 53.71% 9.05% 34.85%
(2005-2007) (2005-2008) (2006-2007)
U.A.E. 57.75% 7.19% 13.40%
(2005-2007) (2005-2008) (2005)
Average (6) 55.32% 7.23% 29.69%
Notes.
(1) Source: Penn's World Tables.
(2) Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.
(3) Hydrocarbons revenues are obtained by multiplying the amount
of fuel revenues as a percentage of merchandise exports by the ratio
between merchandise exports and GDP.
(4) Total public investment is proxied by the total spending on
education.
(5) Source: International Labour Organization, United Nations.
(6) Average is the simple mean of the values for the six countries
considered in the analysis. 30Table 2: Data on oil revenues for GCC countries. Selected years.
Oil Production Exchange Rate GDP De
ator CPI
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (5) (6)
Bahrain 48 0.38 9.52% 3.19%
(2009) (2009) (2007-2008) (2007-2009)
Kuwait 2496 0.29 5.94% 6.64%
(2009) (2009) (2007) (2007-2009)
Oman 816 0.38 16.62% 7.27%
(2009) (2009) (2007-2008) (2007-2009)
Qatar 1213 3.64 19.13% 7.58%
(2009) (2009) (2006) (2007-2009)
Saudi Arabia 9763 3.75 -0.93% 6.34%
(2009) (2009) (2007-2009) (2007-2009)
U.A.E. 2795 3.67 8.39% n.a.
(2009) (2009) (2007-2009)
Notes.
(1) Thousand barrels per day.
(2) Source: Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy.
(3) National currency per U.S. dollar. All GCC countries are characterized by a xed exchange
rate against the U.S. dollar.
(4) Source: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund.
(5) Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.
(6) Year-on-year percentage changes.
31Table 3: Estimation of AR(1) models of oil revenues and government consumption expen-
diture.
Country Sample Z Z
Bahrain 1994 - 2008 0.97 0.21
Kuwait 1994 - 2007 0.90 0.19
Oman 1994 - 2008 0.80 0.19
Qatar 1994 - 2009 0.88 0.25
Saudi Arabia 1994 - 2009 0.82 0.23
U.A.E. 1994 - 2009 0.76 0.24
Average (1) 0.86 0.22
Country Sample G G
Bahrain 1980 - 2006 0.80 0.09
Kuwait 1980 - 2007 0.63 0.10
Oman 1980 - 2007 0.86 0.10
Qatar 1980 - 2007 0.96 0.13
Saudi Arabia 1980 - 2007 0.93 0.06
U.A.E. 1980 - 2007 0.96 0.07
Average (1) 0.86 0.09
Notes.
X and X denote the coecient associated to the lag value
of the dependent variable and the variance of the error term,
respectively of an AR(1) model for X = fZ; Gg (see equations
18 and 19).
(1) Average is the simple mean of the values for the six countries
considered in the analysis.
32Table 4: Parameters and steady-state values for a representative oil producing country.
a) Parameter
Preferences  = 0:96
 = 2
  = 1
# = 4:17









corr(Z; G) = 0
b) Steady-state Variables
Private Sector Y = 1:00
C=Y = 0:43
IP=Y = 0:21
Government G=Y = 0:29
(WNG)=Y = 0:19
IG=Y = 0:07
Oil Sector Z=Y = 0:55
Market Clearing Condition N = 0:20
NP=N = 0:70
KP=K = 0:46
Y P=Y = 0:63
NG=N = 0:30
KG=K = 0:54
Y G=Y = 0:37
Note.
This Table shows the values of parameters and steady state variables
used in the simulation exercise.
33Table 5: Standard deviations of selected economic variables.
Variables Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar
Total output 0.060 0.128 0.041 0.096
Consumption 0.099 0.369 0.100 0.133
Total investment 0.318 0.359 0.182 0.258
Total labour 0.006 0.010 0.009 0.013
Gov. consumption 0.045 0.201 0.069 0.144
Oil revenues 0.208 0.189 0.195 0.212
Variables Saudi Arabia U.A.E. Average (1) Simulated data
Total output 0.081 0.070 0.079 0.052
Consumption 0.059 0.074 0.139 0.092
Total investment 0.181 0.075 0.229 0.044
Total labour 0.009 0.005 0.009 0.073
Government consumption 0.113 0.109 0.114 0.059
Oil revenues 0.203 0.202 0.201 0.145
Note.
(1) Average is the simple mean of the values for the six countries considered in the analysis.
34Table 6: Contemporanous correlation with output of selected economic variables. Actual
data.
Variables Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar
Total output 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Consumption 0.336 -0.016 0.043 0.634
Total investment 0.728 0.159 -0.200 0.857
Total labour -0.232 0.667 0.833 0.084
Gov. consumption 0.288 0.092 0.728 0.068
Oil revenues 0.954 0.312 0.167 0.896
Variables Saudi Arabia U.A.E. Average (1)
Total output 1.00 1.00 1.00
Consumption 0.318 0.137 0.242
Total investment 0.624 0.928 0.516
Total labour -0.877 0.132 0.101
Government consumption 0.511 0.736 0.404
Oil revenues 0.295 0.923 0.591
Notes.
The entries of this Table denote the degree of contemporaneous correlation
between output Yt and the variable vt reported in column 1 (i.e. corr(vt;Yt)).
(1) Average is the simple mean of the values for the six countries considered
in the analysis.
35Table 7: Contemporaneous and non-contemporaneous correlation with output of selected
economic variables. Simulated data.
Variables j=2 j=1 j=0 j=-1 j=-2
Total output -0.25 0.08 1.00 0.08 -0.25
Consumption -0.24 0.09 1.00 0.06 -0.27
Total investment -0.05 -0.11 -0.17 0.16 0.17
Total labour -0.26 0.08 1.00 0.08 -0.25
Government consumption -0.17 0.11 0.81 0.00 -0.26
Oil revenues 0.10 -0.10 -0.57 0.02 0.20
Note.
The entries of this Table denote the degree of correlation between output
at time t, Yt and the variable vt reported in column 1 at time t + j
(i.e. corr(vt+j;Yt) where j =  2;  1; 0; 1; 2).
36Table 8: Eects of an exogenous shock to oil revenues (Z) and to government consumption
(G).
Shock to Z Private sector Public Sector Total
Investments # " (# after 10 years) (1) #
Capital # " # (" 6 yrs)
Labour # " #




Shock to G Private sector Public Sector Total
Investments " # #
Capital " # #
Labour " " (# 6 yrs) "





In parenthesis we report when the positive (negative) eect of the shock
becomes negative (positive).
37Table 9: Standard deviations of simulated economic variables. Sensitivity to degree of
substitutability between private and public consumption expenditure ( )
Variables   = 1   = 0:75   = 0:5   = 0:25   = 0
Private capital 0.045 0.046 0.047 0.048 0.050
Public capital 0.036 0.037 0.037 0.038 0.039
Total output 0.052 0.054 0.058 0.062 0.067
Private output 0.073 0.076 0.080 0.085 0.090
Public output 0.048 0.049 0.051 0.053 0.056
Consumption 0.093 0.098 0.104 0.111 0.119
Total investments 0.044 0.046 0.048 0.051 0.054
Private investments 0.445 0.455 0.467 0.480 0.495
Public investments 1.265 1.283 1.303 1.326 1.352
Total labour 0.073 0.078 0.082 0.088 0.095
Private labour 0.089 0.094 0.099 0.105 0.113
Public labour 0.064 0.066 0.068 0.072 0.077
Total capital 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Wages 0.020 0.021 0.022 0.023 0.025
Interest rates 0.046 0.048 0.051 0.055 0.059
Government consumption 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059
Oil revenues 0.145 0.145 0.145 0.145 0.145
38Table 10: Contemporaneous correlation with output of relevant economic variables, sim-
ulated data. Sensitivity to  
Variables   = 1   = 0:75   = 0:5   = 0:25   = 0
Private capital 0.54 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.59
Public capital -0.58 -0.59 -0.60 -0.60 -0.61
Total output 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Private output 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.96
Public output 0.48 0.50 0.53 0.56 0.60
Consumption 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Total investments -0.17 -0.06 0.04 0.15 0.26
Private investments 0.74 0.77 0.80 0.83 0.86
Public investments -0.80 -0.83 -0.86 -0.88 -0.90
Total labour 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Private labour 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
Public labour 0.66 0.68 0.70 0.73 0.75
Total capital -0.04 0.03 0.10 0.17 0.23
Wages 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97
Interest rates -0.96 -0.96 -0.96 -0.97 -0.97
Government consumption 0.81 0.78 0.74 0.71 0.67
Oil revenues -0.57 -0.62 -0.66 -0.70 -0.73
Note.
The entries of this Table denote the degree of contemporaneous correlation between
output Yt and the variable vt reported in column 1 (i.e. corr(vt;Yt)).
The rst row indicates how the values of parameter   have changed relative to the benchmark
case (  = 1).
39Table 11: Standard deviations of simulated economic variables. Sensitivity to the size of













Variables = 0:67 = 0:64 = 0:58 = 0:51 = 0:45
Private capital 0.055 0.044 0.041 0.042 0.044
Public capital 0.048 0.036 0.027 0.022 0.019
Total output 0.113 0.051 0.023 0.018 0.016
Private output 0.140 0.072 0.04 0.031 0.028
Public output 0.089 0.048 0.041 0.042 0.043
Consumption 0.206 0.092 0.043 0.035 0.034
Total investments 0.058 0.044 0.053 0.066 0.08
Private investments 0.542 0.444 0.411 0.419 0.445
Public investments 1.661 1.264 0.956 0.791 0.678
Total labour 0.162 0.073 0.034 0.026 0.024
Private labour 0.183 0.089 0.044 0.032 0.027
Public labour 0.130 0.063 0.05 0.052 0.054
Total capital 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.008 0.01
Wages 0.045 0.019 0.011 0.011 0.012
Interest rates 0.104 0.045 0.025 0.025 0.028
Government consumption 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059
Oil revenues 0.145 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.144
40Table 12: Contemporaneous correlation with output of relevant economic variables, sim-













Variables = 0:67 = 0:64 = 0:58 = 0:51 = 0:45
Private capital 0.62 0.54 0.29 0.06 -0.06
Public capital -0.63 -0.58 -0.38 -0.19 -0.09
Total output 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Private output 0.98 0.94 0.80 0.66 0.56
Public output 0.82 0.48 0.23 0.32 0.39
Consumption 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.95 0.92
Total investments 0.60 -0.17 -0.87 -0.90 -0.78
Private investments 0.90 0.74 0.30 -0.10 -0.32
Public investments -0.92 -0.80 -0.45 -0.12 0.07
Total labour 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98
Private labour 0.99 0.98 0.92 0.87 0.85
Public labour 0.90 0.66 0.36 0.41 0.45
Total capital -0.29 -0.04 -0.02 -0.14 -0.20
Wages 0.99 0.96 0.79 0.70 0.66
Interest rates -0.99 -0.96 -0.79 -0.70 -0.66
Government consumption 0.66 0.81 0.98 0.95 0.86
Oil revenues -0.74 -0.57 -0.12 0.26 0.47
Note.
The entries of this Table denote the degree of contemporaneous correlation between
output Yt and the variable vt reported in column 1 (i.e. corr(vt;Yt)).
The rst row indicates how the ratio C+I
P




41Figure 1: Eects of exogenous oil shocks.
a) Effects on investments 
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42Figure 2: Eects of exogenous oil shocks (ctd).
b) Effects on capital 
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43Figure 3: Eects of exogenous oil shocks (ctd).
c) Effects on labour 
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44Figure 4: Eects of exogenous oil shocks (ctd).
d) Effects on output 
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45Figure 5: Eects of exogenous oil shocks (ctd).
e) Effects on consumption, wages and interest rates 
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46Figure 6: Eects of shocks to government expenditure.
 a) Effects on investments 
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47Figure 7: Eects of shocks to government expenditure (ctd).
b) Effects on capital 
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48Figure 8: Eects of shocks to government expenditure (ctd).
c) Effects on labour 










































private labour  
 














































public labour   
 


















































49Figure 9: Eects of shocks to government expenditure (ctd).
d) Effects on output 
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50Figure 10: Eects of shocks to government expenditure (ctd).
 
e) Effects on consumption, wages and interest rates 
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  51Figure 11: Eects of exogenous oil shocks,   = 0:5.
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52Figure 12: Eects of shocks to government expenditure,   = 0:5.
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53Figure 13: Eects of shocks to oil shocks, (C + IP)=Y = 0:51.
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54Figure 14: Eects of exogenous government expenditure, (C + IP)=Y = 0:51.
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